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SOCIAL SCIENTISTS TAKE THE STAND: 
A REVIEW AND APPRAISAL OF THEIR TESTIMONY IN LITIGATION 
Jack Greenberg* 
"How to inform the judicial mind, as you know, is one of the 
most complicated problems,''1 said Justice Frankfurter 
during argument of the school segregation cases. And as law deals 
more and more with issues of great public consequence the judici-
ary's need for knowledge increases. Much of this knowledge is 
within the realm of what are called the social sciences. 
Although jurisprudents and social scientists have long com-
plained of a gulf between law and social science,2 little notice has 
been given to the recent, recurrent collaboration between the two 
at the trial level. In a variety of cases social scientists' testimony 
is playing a role in the shaping of judge-made law and in helping 
find relevant facts which must be proved under existing rules of 
law. 
Such evidence is as significant as its precursor, the "Brandeis 
Brief," for social science information may be relevant in many 
cases. Social scientists have testified in recent cases on such ques-
tions as: What are the psychological effects of racial segregation? 
Are Negroes inherently intellectually inferior to white people? Is 
a community's public opinion such that a defendant cannot re-
ceive a fair trial there? Is a label on a bottle of orange drink mis-
leading? Are two trademarks likely to be confused? Is a book so 
• A.B., 1945, C.Olumbia College; LL.B., 1948, Columbia Law School; member, New 
York bar; assistant counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; co-author, 
Citizens Guide to Desegregation (1955).-Ed. 
1 Justice Felix Frankfurter, from the bench, during the first reargument of the school 
segregation cases [347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954)]. Transcript of Argument, Briggs v. 
Elliott, No. 102 in the United States Supreme Court, October Term, 1952, p. 59. The 
arguments were stenograpbically transcribed and the transcriptions are in the possession 
of counsel in the cases. 
2 Llewellyn, "Law and the Social Sciences-Especially Sociology," 62 HARv. L. REv. 
1286 (1949); Simpson and Field, "Social Engineering Through Law," 22 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. 
REv. 145 (1947); C.Owan, "The Relation of Law to Experimental Social Science," 96 UNIV. 
PA. L. R.Ev. 484 (1948); Simpson and Field, "Law and the Social Sciences," 32 VA. L. REv. 
855 (1946). Social science assistance in legislative rule-making is not uncommon-almost 
any daily paper will tell of a psychologist, psychiatrist or economist testifying before a 
legislative committee. See, Sorensen, "Sociology's Potential C.Ontributions to Legislative 
Policy Determination," 16 AM. Soc. R.Ev. 239 (1951). In a limited related area there has 
been social science assistaJ_J.ce in the appellate courts-the "Brandeis Brief" which marshals 
social science and other authorities to show the reasonableness and hence the constitu-
tionality of legislation. See, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 at 419, 28 S.Ct. 324 (1908), 
especially note l; MAsoN, BRANDEIS, A FREEMAN'S LIFE 248-251 (1946); WYZANSKI, A TRIAL 
JUDGE'S FREEDOM AND REsPONSmILITY 18 (1952). 
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obscene that it is likely to corrupt youth?3 To help with the 
answers, social science testimony has been presented or suggested 
in cases involving issues ranging from segregation to banking-with 
trademarks, criminal law, religious freedom, censorship, natural-
ization and antitrust in between. 
This testimony has helped courts to make decisions in two ways: 
( 1) Before an existing rule of law can be applied, relevant 
facts must be shown. Sometimes they have been established by 
social scientific experts. For example, there are the trademark 
cases4 where the issue is whether two trademarks may be confused 
with one another. In such cases a psychological or public opinion 
analysis may help. 
(2) Social scientists' testimony was used in a wholly different 
and new way in the recent school segregation cases. There, by 
placing before the Court authoritative scientific opinions regard-
ing the effect of racial classification and of "separate but equal" 
treatment, the plaintiffs helped persuade the Court in the shap-
ing of a judge-made rule of law. 
Testimony to Establish Relevant Facts 
A recent example of the use of social science testimony for a 
conventional purpose is found in the church-state case, Tudor v. 
Board of Education,5 in which Chief Justice Vanderbilt's opinion 
quotes extensively from the testimony of a social psychologist, an 
educational sociologist and an educator. The issue was whether 
the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution (as incorporated 
into the Fourteenth) and Article I, paragraph 4 of the New Jersey 
Constitution forbade distribution of the Gideon Bible in New 
Jersey public schools. The Bibles had been given to the schools 
free of charge. Each child was asked to sign a card requesting one, 
much as request for released time was made in Zorach v. Clauson.6 
However, in Zorach there was no testimony as to whether the 
choice was free, or whether the children were coerced by psycho-
logical or other means. Justice Douglas, for the majority, felt that 
the issue of the coerciveness of the program was irrelevant; more-
3 Many other uses-chiefly involving public opinion polls-have been suggested. See 
Sorensen and Sorensen, "The Admissibility and Use of Opinion Research Evidence,'' 28 
N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. R.Ev. 1213 at 1257-1259 (1953); note, 66 HARV. L. REv. 498 at 508-513 
(1952). 
4 Note 22 infra. 
514 N.J. 31, 100 A (2d) 857 (1953). 
6 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952). 
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over, testimony of coercion was inadmissible because the issue had 
not been properly raised. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the 
ground, among others, that plaintiffs should have been permitted 
to make their proof. 7 
But in the Tudor case the Supreme Court of New Jersey treated 
the question of coerciveness as a factual one. The school board 
urged that accepting a Bible was optional, therefore the program 
did not interfere with the free exercise of religion. But, the 
opinion retorted, this argument ignores reality. The testimony 
of the social scientists was quoted to show that the distribution 
system tended, by psychological pressures, to compel children to 
accept Bibles. Quoted testimony also stated that the method of 
distribution created divisive tensions among children. This find-
ing appears to be irrelevant, but it apparently contributed to the 
result as somewhat of a policy makeweight at least. 
Further illustrations of the need for this type of testimony at 
the fact level can be found in the censorship field. In Parmelee v. 
United States, an action to confiscate and destroy certain books 
entitled Nudism in Modern Life, the court, noting the lack of 
social science evidence, wrote: 
" ... perhaps the most useful definition of obscene is that 
presented in ... United States v. Kennerley, i.e., that it indi-
cates 'the present critical point in the compromise between 
candor and shame at which the community may have arrived 
here and now.' But when we attempt to' locate that critical 
point in the situation of the present case, we find nothing in 
the record to guide us except the book itself. The question is 
a difficult one, as to which the expert opinion of psychologists 
and sociologists would seem to be helpful if not necessary. 
Assumptions to the contrary which appear in some of the 
earlier cases, reveal the profound ignorance of psychology and 
sociology which prevailed generally, when those opinions were 
written. More recently, in the cases and textbooks, the de-
sirability and pertinence of such evidence has been suggested. 
Lacking such assistance in the present case, we can compensate 
for it in some measure by noticing, judicially, evidence which 
is thus available to us.''8 
But there are cases in which such testimony has been admitted. 
In State v. Scope the defendant was indicted for obscene libel for 
showing the movie, "Hollywood Peep Show.'' A psychiatrist 
7Id. at 322. 
s (D.C. Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 729 at 732. 
956 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
testified for the state that the film was apt to injure teen-agers psy-
chologically and would tend to rouse base emotions in normal 
adult males. The court held the testimony admissible: 
" ... we think that there is a reasonable basis for the ad-
mission of the experts' opinion that the film in question would 
tend to have harmful results, at least in the subconscious mind, 
of the average, normal man. The science of psychiatry, while 
still in its infancy, has made tremendous strides in recent 
years. Much of it has to do with the workings of the sub-
conscious mind about which the average person obviously 
knows nothing. If, therefore, it is a fact that the effect of this 
film might be latent, rather than immediate-that its delete-
rious effects would linger with probable future undesirable, 
emotional results not even realized in the conscious mind-
then we can see no error in admitting such testimony upon 
the theory that it would be material and helpful to a jury. 
However, we doubt if the admission of the evidence as to the 
effect ... upon the conscious mind of the normal adult was 
correct. . . . "9 
In other cases evidence of this kind has been admitted.10 
But in Commonwealth v. Isenstadt11 the Massachusetts Su-
preme Court took another view of admissibility. The defendant 
was tried for violating the obscenity law by selling the book 
Strange Fruit. He attempted to introduce the testimony of a 
writer and teacher of literature, a child psychiatrist and a profes-
sor of theology, to show that the book would "elevate rather than 
corrupt morals." The testimony was excluded on the ground that 
it concerned "nothing more than the reaction of normal human 
beings" and that "there is reason to believe that a jury, being com-
posed of men drawn from the various segments of that public, 
would be as goqd a judge of the effect as experts in literature or 
psychiatry, whose ... mental reactions ... are likely to be entirely 
different from those of the general public." If such evidence were 
admissible, many cases could not "be adequately tried without an 
expensive array of experts on both sides. Experience in those 
fields in which expert testimony is now admittedly necessary does 
not lead us to look with favor upon such a sweeping extension. 
9 46 Del. 519 at 526, 86 A. (2d) 154 (1952). 
10 People v. Larsen, 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 55 at 56 (1938); People v. Viking Press, 147 Misc. 
813, 264 N.Y.S. 534 (1933); Besig v. United States, (9th Cir. 1953) 208 F. (2d) 142 at 147. 
11318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E. 840 (1945). 
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Without prejudging the indefinite future, we are not convinced 
that the time has come for it. "12 
Public opinion analysts are the social scientists who have testi-
fied, and whose testimony has been suggested, most often.13 Public 
opinion may be an issue in many kinds of cases.14 Recently author-
ity has held such testimony admissible on several occasions. In 
one case the issue was whether Bireley's Orange Beverage was 
"economically adulterated" in that it allegedly appeared to the 
average consumer to better than it was.15 The Government 
charged that it appeared to contain a great deal of orange juice, al-
though it contained only 6 percent orange juice and was mostly 
water. The Government attempted to introduce a public opinion 
survey of 3,539 persons to establish what people thought the Bire-
ley product contained. There was a hearsay objection. But the 
court concluded that it was unfounded. Judge Hastie wrote: 
" . . . The statements of the persons interviewed were not 
offered for the truthfulness of their assertions as to the com-
position of the beverage .... They were offered solely to show 
as a fact the reaction of ordinary householders and others_ of 
the public generally when shown a bottle of Bireley's Orange 
Beverage. Only the credibility of those who took the state-
ments was involved, and they were before the court. The 
technical adequacy of the surveys was a matter of the weight 
to be attached to them. And claimant was properly permitted 
to introduce elaborate testimony on this point."16 
The understanding of "savings bank" was an issue in an action 
by New York State to restrain a national bank from using the words 
"savings" in its publicity. Section 258 of the New York Banking 
Law forbade national banks to use the word "savings." Instead 
they were required to use terms like "thrift account" or "special 
interest" account. Defendant produced a poll to show the public 
12 Id. at 558-559. 
13 See, Kennedy, "Law and the Courts," in MEIER AND SAUNDERS, THE POI.LS AND 
PUBLIC OPINION 92 (1949); Sorensen and Sorensen, "The Admissibility and Use of Opinion 
Research Evidence," 28 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. REv. 1213 (1953); notes, 66 HARV. L. REv. 498 
(1952), 20 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 211 (1951). 
14 See note 3 supra. We may add antitrust cases to the types of cases discussed in the 
text. In the United States' suit against the professional football teams, pollsters' testimony 
concerning the effect of the television blackout imposed by some teams was admitted 
subject to motions to strike. United States v. National Football League, (D.C. Pa. 1953) 
116 F. Supp. 319. See, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1953, p. 34:1; Sorensen and Sorensen, "The 
Admissibility and Use of Opinion Research Evidence," 28 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. REv. 1213 at 
1218 (1953). 
15 United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, (3d Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 967. 
16 Id. at 974. 
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understanding of "savings" which showed that "savings" would 
attract depositors more readily than the other terms. The court 
reviewed the polling technique in detail and the testimony con-
cerning it. It concluded: 
"Polls, as evidence, are not controlling,. of course. Many 
are misleading; valueless .... 
"A party endeavoring to establish the public state of mind 
on a subject, which state of mind can not be proved except by 
calling as witnesses so many of the public as to render the task 
impracticable, should be allowed to offer evidence concern-
ing a poll which the party maintains reveals that state of mind. 
The evidence offered should include calling the planners, 
supervisors, and workers (or some of them) as witnesses so that 
the court may see and hear them; they should be ready to give 
a complete exposition of the poll and even its results; the work 
sheets, reports, surveys and all documents used in or prepared 
during the poll taking and those showing its results should be 
offered in evidence, although the court may desire to draw its 
own conclusions. In this trial the learned counsel for de-
fendant advanced proof of the kind to which I have just re-
ferred. I think that the proof as to the poll should be received 
in evidence.''17 · 
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court the poll 
was not mentioned in Justice Jackson's opinion for the majority, 
but he assumed that the word "savings" was important to de-
fendant: " ... they must be deemed to have the right to advertise 
that fact by using the commonly understood description which 
Congress has specifically selected.''38 . 
However, in most cases where polls have been introduced, ob-
jection apparently was not made,19 so there are few direct holdings 
that polls are admissible. 
17 People v. Franklin Nat. Bank of Franklin Square, 200 Misc. 557 at 565-566, 105 
N.Y.S. (2d) 81 (1951), revd. 281 App. Div. 757, ll8 N.Y.S. (2d) 210 (1953), affd. 305 N.Y. 
453, 113 N.E. (2d) 796 (1953), revd. 347 U.S. 373, 74 S.Ct. 550 (1954). Interestingly, the 
trial judge commented that he believed the pollsters' conclusions and that they coincided 
with his personal opinion. This comment is suggestive of Judge Waring's dissent in 
Briggs v. Elliot [ (D.C. S.C. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 529 at 538]. He, too, felt that the testimony 
coincided with what he knew. The North-South split in acceptance of the scientists' 
testimony in the school segregation cases is in the same vein. 
18 Franklin Nat. Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 at 378, 74 S.Ct. 
550 (1954). Italics added. 
19 The cases are cited in Sorensen and Sorensen, "The Admissibility and Use of Opin-
ion Research Evidence," 28 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. REv. 1213 (1953), and note, 66 HARv. L. REv. 
498 (1952). Polls have been held admissible in Franklin Nat. Bank of Franklin Square v. 
New York, 347 U.S. 373, 74 S.Ct. 550 (1954); Household Finance Corp. v. Federal Finance 
Corp., (D.C. Ariz. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 164; S. C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, (D.C. N.Y. 
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In some cases the lack of a poll where public opinion is an issue 
had been noted judicially. In a recent naturalization case, Judge 
Learned Hand had to decide whether a man who had killed his 
thirteen-year-old son possessed good moral character. The son was 
confined to a crib; he was deaf, mute, and deformed by a birth in-
jury which deprived him of bladder and bowel control. The 
father was convicted of second degree manslaughter, bu~ the jury 
recommended utmost clemency. He received a light sentence and 
was placed on probation. His moral character was otherwise un-
questionably good. Judge Hand held that the legal test of good 
moral character was whether it conformed to "the generally ac-
cepted moral conventions current at the time," but that in "the 
absence of some national inquisition, like a Gallup poll, that is 
indeed a difficult test to apply .... " He concluded: 
" . . . quite independently of what may be the current 
moral feeling as to legally administered euthanasia, we feel 
reasonably secure in holding that only a minority of virtuous 
persons would deem the practice morally justifiable, while it 
remains in private hands, even when the provocation is as 
overwhelming as it was in this instance. "20 
Judge Jerome Frank dissented.21 He believed that an issue 
importantly affecting a man's life should not be decided by resort 
to "mere unchecked surmises." He recommended remanding to 
the district judge with directions to give the petitioner and the 
Government an opportunity to produce reliable information on 
the subject which the judge might supplement; based upon this, 
the judge should reconsider his decision. "Then if there is an-
other appeal, we can avoid sheer guessing .... " Judge Frank has 
on other occasions indicated concern over the fact-finding prob-
lem presented by legal issues involving public opinion.22 
1939) 28 F. Supp. 744, mod. (2d Cir. 1940) 116 F (2d) 427; United States v. 88 Cases of 
Bireley's Orange Beverage, (3d Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 967. One might argue about how 
strong the "holding" is in some of these cases. See also Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 
(7th Cir. 1953) 208 F. (2d) 382, which adopts the rule of Bireley; but Rhodes deals with 
the admissibility of such testimony before an administrative body, the FTC. 
20 Repouille v. United States, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 152 at 153. 
21 Id. at 154-155. 
22 In a trademark case which involved the issue of whether the word "Seventeen" on 
a girdle was likely to be confused with the word "Seventeen" on a magazine, he dissented 
once more, noting the desirability of equipping courts to find such facts. Triangle Publi-
cations v. Rohrlich, (2d Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 969 at 974, 976. In so doing he noted (at 
976-977) that plaintiff might have employed " 'laboratory' tests, of a sort now familiar, to 
ascertain whether numerous girls and women, seeing both plaintiff's magazine and de-
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There are, of course, problems of admissibility and weight of 
the evidence. In all cases where an expert testifies, he must first 
be qualified as especially able to make the judgment he proposes 
· to offer. Therefore, there are the problems of whether his branch 
of social science is sufficiently certain to warrant an authoritative 
opinion and whether the expert is sufficiently versed in his field. 
What stai:idard should be applied? There appears to be no reason 
why the standard should be any different from that for experts in 
general. A leading treatise states: "In determining whether a 
witness is qualified to testify as an expert, the test is whether his 
knowledge is such that his opinion may aid the jury; but whether 
it is helpful or not is a question for the court."23 It does not ap-
pear that more has been required in the case of social scientists.24 
Expertise is established by examination and cross-examination 
prior to the witness' testimony. Each case is decided on its in-
dividual merits.25 
An example of a problem that may arise in qualifying ·a witness 
of this type appears in a colloquy which took place in Briggs v. 
Elliott,26 the South Carolina school segregation case. Plaintiffs 
attempted to introduce the testimony of a political scientist con-
cerning the effects of segregation "in the development of citizen-
ship." 
Judge Parker: "It seems to me that any lawyer or any man 
who has any experience in government would be just as well 
qualified as he would to express an opinion on that. He is not 
a scientist in the field of education .... 
"Do you seriously contend he is qualified to testify as an 
educational expert? What do you say about that Mr. Mar-
shall?" 
Mr. Marshall: " ... we have been trying to ... present 
as many experts in the field with as many different reasons why 
we consider that segregation in and of itself is injurious .... " 
fendant's advertisements, would believe them to be in some way associated." See also La 
Touraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., (2d Cir. 1946) 157 F. (2d) 115 at 119, 120. 
23 ROGERS, EXPERT TESTIMONY, 3d ed., §37 (1941). 
24 In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950), the following colloquy 
appears on pp. 192-193 of the Record: 
"Q. Dr. Redfield, are there any recognizable differences as between Negro and white 
students on the question of their intellectual capacity? 
"Mr. Daniel: Your Honor, we object to that ...• 
"The Court: I suppose his qualifications he has testified to would qualify him to 
draw his conclusion." 
25 RoGERS, EXPERT TESTIMONY, 3d ed., §39 (1941). 
26 (D.C. S.C. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 529. 
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Judge Parker: "Are you going to offer any more witnesses 
along this line?" 
Mr. Marshall: "No, sir. The other witnesses are REAL 
(sic) scientists." 
Judge Parker: "Well, I'll take it for what it's worth. Go 
ahead."27 
In the public opinion poll cases there are problems of ad-
missibility generally related to the hearsay rule. In a recent 
criminal case in Florida, Irvin v. Statel8 the Negro defendant's 
attorneys engaged the Elmo Roper firm to ascertain what part of 
the populace in the county of trial believed defendant guilty, and 
whether the Negro community was so intimidated that a Negro 
juror would fear to vote for acquittal. The poll was excluded 
from evidence because the poll supervisors who testified about .the 
polling methods were not present at every interview, and the dozen 
interviewers who actually asked the questions did not testify con-
cerning each of their 1,500 interviews. The Supreme Court of 
Florida affirmed, holding poll evidence hearsay and also question-
ing the competency of evidence, noting pollsters' incorrect predic-
tions in the 1948 presidential election. 
These problems have been adequately canvassed elsewhere.29 
Courts are apparently growing more liberal in this area, and the 
hearsay objection may not remain too formidable. At any rate, if 
a litigant wants to use the tedious process of putting on every in-
terviewer concerning every interview, he can probably get his poll 
into evidence. He will either obviate the hearsay objection, or by 
weight of sheer boredom persuade his opponent to stipulate much 
of the testimony. 
One of the main problems connected with poll testimony is the 
expense. The poll taken in Irvin v. State cost about $8,000; the 
27 Record, Briggs v. Elliott, No. 101 in the Supreme Court of the United States, Octo-
ber Tenn 1952, p. 103. 
28 66 Fla. 288 at 290-292, 66 S. (2d) 288 (1953), cert. den. 346 U.S. 927, 74 S.Ct. 316 
(1954). This poll is described in detail in Woodward, "A Scientific Attempt to Provide 
Evidence for a Decision on Change o~ Venue," 17 AM. Soc. R.Ev. 447 (1952). Noted in 52 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 914 (1954). 
There are other uses of social science in criminal cases (although it is arguable 
whether a particular science is "social"). In Arens and Meadows, "Psycholinguistics and 
the Confession Dilemma," 56 CoL. L. R.Ev. 19 (1956), the authors describe a psychological 
technique for ascertaining the authorship of purported confessions. But for dangers alleged 
to inhere in carrying psychological investigations too far in ascertaining criminal liability, 
see Silving, "Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases," 69 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 683 (1956). 
29 See note, 66 HARv. L. R.Ev. 498 (1952); Sorensen and Sorensen, "The Admissibility 
and Use of Opinion Research Evidence," 28 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. R.Ev. 1213 (1953); note, 20 
GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 211 (1951). 
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defense could afford it only because it was paid for by the Legal 
Defense Fund of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People. Another problem is that interviewers may not 
want to testify, especially if the case is controversial.30 But apart 
from expense and inconvenience, the relative infrequency of such 
testimony (and social stience testimony in general) has been due to 
unawareness that it can be useful. This difficulty is beginning to 
vanish in the case of public opinion testimony, especially in trade-
mark and similar litigation, as the past few years have seen a num-
ber of decisions and articles in legal and sociological journals con-
cerning such techniques. But the weight accorded such testimony 
is still generally not impressive. Courts sometimes question the 
objectivity of the survey,31 which may be understandable if they 
are, confronted by two polls with conflicting results. 
Testimony To Influence Shaping of Judge-Made Law 
In all the cases discussed so far the testimony of social scientists 
was used in a rather conventional manner. The witnesses testified 
either as fact-gatherers or as experts whose opinions were them-
selves relevant facts. It is submitted that the school segregation 
cases suggest an entirely different way in which the testimony of 
social scientists can be made useful to the courts. 
Before a new court-made rule of law ca~ be formulated it is 
often necessary to know what is occurring or may occur in society. 
A variety of information drawn from sociology and elsewhere, al-
though not usually proved, is brought to bear along with the 
court's concepts of justice and welfare.32 Such information is 
generally judicially noticed, sometimes explicitly, sometimes 
tacitly.33 Legal analysis or experience may expose these basic as-
sumptions; whether they are well founded may sometimes be 
proved or disproved with the help of social science. In the school 
segregation cases, for instance, social science testimony, with other 
information, was used to help refute the assumptions of "separate 
but equal." Although literature is <;>£ten helpful for such pur-
poses, expert testimony, if available, can be more relevant and 
timely, and can be tested by cross-examination and rebuttal. 
so See Waterbury, "Opinion Surveys in Civil Litigation," 17 PuB. OP. Q. 71 at 86 (1953). 
31 Note, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 211 at 227 (1951). 
32 CARoozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 30, 64--66 (1921). 
S3 See Davis, "Judicial Notice," 55 COL. L. REV. 945 (1955). 
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The recently demolished legal keystone of racial segregation in 
education, Plessy v. Ferguson, held in 1896: 
" ... the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument [is] 
. . . the assumption that the enforced separation of the two 
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority .... 
The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be over-
come by legislation. . . . Legislation is powerless to eradicate 
racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical 
differences .... "34 
This argument was, of course, rejected by the Supreme Court 
on May 17, 1954 in the school cases.35 And when the Court made 
its decision it had before it records full of testimony by social 
scientists relating to the assumptions made by Plessy. These 
witnesses were called by counsel for plaintiffs in the belief that live 
testimony, subject to cross-examination and rebuttal, could be 
more pertinent and compelling than quotations from books and 
articles. 
Experts on the segregation issue were first prominently used in 
cases involving segregated higher education. In Sweatt v. Painter6 
social scientists testified that there is no inherent intellectual in-
feriority determined by race.37 The testimony was directed at the 
claim that such alleged differences warranted segregation as a 
reasonable classification based on learning capacity. There was 
also testimony on the harmful effects of segregation38 which were 
later recognized by the Supreme Court in the school cases.39 
In those cases at least twenty social scientists from institutions 
all over the country testified.40 They exhaustively analyzed school 
segregation from different scientific points of view, on the basis of 
their learning and experience, and, in some instances, examination 
of plaintiff children. The four trial courts which heard this testi-
mony split in their acceptance of it, two-to-two: Delaware41 and 
34163 U.S. 537 at 551, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896). 
35 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954). 
36 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950). 
37 Record, Sweatt v. Painter, p. 193. 
38 Id. at 194. The testimony was apparently offered for the purpose of showing 
inequality but accepting its general validity could mean only the end of "separate but 
equal" and hence a new rule of law. This was recognized by the Delaware chancellor in 
Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del. Ch. 343 at 350, 87 A. (2d) 862 (1952). 
39 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 at 493-495, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954). 
40 The extent of social scientists' involvement in the school segregation cases is de-
scribed in detail in Hn.L AND GREENBERG, CITIZENS GUIDE TO DESEGREGATION, especially c. 8 
(1955). See also Clark, "Desegregation, An Appraisal of the Evidence," 9 J. OF Soc. lssUES 
1 at 4-5 (1953). 
41 Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del. Ch. 343, 87 A. (2d) 862 (1952), alfd. 91 A. (2d) 137 (1952). 
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Kansas42 finding it true (although legally irrelevant in view of 
Plessy ), Virginia43 and South Carolina,44 one judge dissenting, dis-
missing it as unproved and irrelevant. The South Carolina federal 
district court held: 
"The federal courts would be going far outside their con-
stitutional function were they to attempt to prescribe educa-
tional policies for the states in such matters, however desirable 
such policies might be in the opinion of some sociologists or 
educators."45 
However, Judge Waring dissenting, wrote: 
"These witnesses testified from actual study and tests in 
various parts of the country, including tests in the actual 
Clarendon School district under consideration. They showed 
beyond a doubt that the evils of segregation and color preju-
dice come from early training. And from their testimony 
as well as from common experience and knowledge and from 
our own reasoning, we must unavoidably come to the con-
clusion that racial prejudice is something that is acquired and 
that that acquiring is in early childhood."46 
But the Kansas court found that segregation was harmful, a 
finding which the Supreme Court quoted with approval: 
"Segregation of white and colored children in public 
schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. 
The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for 
the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as 
denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of in-
feriority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation 
with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to retard 
the education and mental development of negro children and 
to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive 
in a racially integrated school system."47 
The Delaware chancellor made a similar holding.48 Following 
the decision of the school cases in the Supreme Court, similar 
testimony has been presented in other proceedings involving 
segregation in schools.49 
42 Brown v. Board of Education, (D.C. Kan. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 797. 
43 Davis v. County School Board, (D.C. Va. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 337. 
44 Briggs v. Elliott, (D.C. S.C. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 529. 
45 Id. at 536. 
46 Id. at 547. 
47 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 438 at 494, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954). 
48 Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del. Ch. 343 at 348, 87 A. (2d) 862 (1952). 
49 There was such testimony in Walker v. Board of Education of Englewood, I Race 
Relations Law Reporter 255 (1956), a proceeding before the New Jersey State Department 
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What role did the social science testimony play in the decision 
of the school cases? Although some have applauded or denounced 
the decisions as based principally on the testimony,50 a reading of 
the decisions reveals that the Supreme Court did not refer to the 
testimony, nor did it affirm or reverse the findings below on the 
effects of segregation. Indeed, in the District of Columbia case,51 
it made its decision on a record devoid of testimony. If it had 
found "inequality" as facts are normally found in litigation, it 
would have left open the possibility of a future case in which there 
might be defense testimony that Negroes are psychologically better 
off in segregated schools.52 This is obviously impossible; indeed, 
the Court on May 31, 1955 ruled that "all provisions of federal, 
state, or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination 
must yield to this [the May 17, 195453 ] principle." Therefore, if 
the testimony played any role it was a "legislating" one, in the 
change from one rule of law to another. 
But did it play any role? Of course, since the opinion does 
not say, we must speculate. Social scientists' research during re-
cent decades deserves much of the credit for the general recognition 
of segregation's harm. Much of the testimony could only re-
capitulate what is already knmvn, although in terms of these cases. 
But it is not unfair to assume that the summarizing, emphasizing, 
and relating of the general to the specific by eminent experts 
illuminated the issues and perhaps informed for the first time one 
or more members of the bench whose interests might not have led 
them earlier to acquire such information.54 Combined with a 
of Education involving a charge of gerrymandering of school district lines. But the 
opinion does not discuss the testimony. See also Gordon, "The Girard College Case: De-
segregation and a Municipal Trust," 304 THE ANNALS 53 at 57, 59 (1956). 
-50 See S. Res. 104, May 25, 1955, introduced by Senator Eastland: "Whereas this deci-
sion was based solely and alone on psychological, sociological and anthropological consid-
erations ••• "; and Dr. Kenneth Clark's speech at the Fisk Race Relations Institute, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 2, 1955, p. 16:4, commending the decision for resting on the social scientists' 
testimony. 
lil Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693 (1954). 
52 Indeed, Florida so interpreted the decision and urged on the second reargument 
of the cases that a Negro applicant to a white school should have to show that he feels 
he "would be handicapped in his education ... because of ... psychological or sociological 
reasons ..•• " Brief of the State of Florida as Amicus Curiae, p. 63. 
li3 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.CL 686 (1954). 
54 Not all judges are aware of or believe to be true what social science accepts in this 
area. One federal judge, in upholding segregation on a golf course has recently written: 
"It seeIOS that segregation is not only recognized in constitutional law and judicial 
decision, but that it is also supported by general principles of natural law. As nature has 
produced different species, so it has produced different races of men. Distinguishing racial 
features have not been produced by man, or man-made laws. They are the result of 
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number of other factors the testimony undoubtedly contributed to 
the final result.66 
This leads one to speculate about what would happen where 
social science experts might testify to theories and information 
from an esoteric. branch of learning, removed from the knowledge 
and experience of informed persons unacquainted with that field. 
Much would depend on the posture of the case. If testifying, for 
example, in support of the constitutionality of legislation, their 
testimony might suffice to establish the law's reasonableness and 
hence its constitutionality. If testifying against the constitutional-
ity, as in the school cases, such an isolated thrust would most prob-
ably fail. 
Justice Frankfurter has indicated from the bench that social 
scientists can help appellate courts in formulating rules of law: 
"Can we not take judicial notice of writing by people who 
competently deal with these problems? Can I not take judi-
cial notice of Myrdal's book without having him called as a 
witness? ... How to inform the judicial mind, as you know, 
is one of the most complicated problems. It is better to have 
witnesses, but I did not know that we could not read the works 
of competent writers."56 
But how is testimony directed to the problem of formulating 
law to be introduced? . Might not counsel say, "Your Honor, I 
realize that this testimony may not properly be used in this case to 
establish a fact at issue in the pleadings. However, the courts 
must declare a rule of law in this case, and. in so doing must con-
sider certain facts about the society in which we live. Materials 
bearing on these facts are often presented in the briefs, or obtained 
from other sources, but I would like the courts to have the benefit 
processes of evolution and it seems natural and customary for d.ifierent species and differ-
ent races to recognize and prefer as intimate associates their own kind. Nature has pro-
duced white birds, black birds, blue birds, and red birds, and they do not roost on the 
same limb or use the same nest. Such recognition and preference of their own kind pre-
vails among other animals. It prevails also among all people, among the yellow, black and 
red skinned races." Hayes v. Crutcher, (D.C. Tenn. 1952) 108 F. Supp. 582 at 585. 
Justice Terrell of the Supreme Court of Florida, in Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board 
of Control, (Fla. 1955) 83 S. (2d) 20, has recently written an opinion in almost identical 
terms, except that it refers to different animals. 
55 See HILL AND GREENBERG, CITIZENS GUIDE TO DESEGREGATION 117-118 (1955), sum-
marizing the forces which contributed to the final result. These include the precedents, 
the history, the mores, and current concepts of welfare andjustice. 
66 Justice Frankfurter, from the bench, during the first reargument of the school 
segregation cases. Transcript of Argument, Briggs v. Elliott, No. 102 in the United States 
Supreme Court, October term, 1952, pp. 58-59. 
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of the testimony of experts on these questions, who will be avail-
able for questioning by my opponent and the bench." This would 
not be unlike what happens before a legislative committee prior to 
the legislative decision upon a rule of law. It should be helpful 
also when the courts legislate in their unique way. At least one 
federal judge might be receptive to the idea. Judge Wyzanski has 
written: 
" . . . Thus the focus of the inquiry becomes not what 
judgment is permissible, but what judgment is sound. And 
here it seems to me that the judge, before deriving any con-
clusions from any such extrajudicial document or informa-
tion, should lay it before the parties for their criticism. 
"How this criticism should be offered is itself a problem 
not free from difficulty. In ·some situations, the better course 
may be to submit the material for examination, cross-examina-
tion and rebuttal evidence. In others, where expert criticism 
has primarily an argumentative character, it can be received 
better from the counsel table and from briefs than from the 
witness box. The important point is that before a judge acts 
upon a consideration of any kind, he ought to give the parties 
a chance to meet it. This opportunity is owed as a matter of 
fairness and also to prevent egregious error. As Professor Lon 
Fuller has observed, the 'moral force of a judgment is at maxi-
mum if a judge decides solely on the basis of arguments pre-
sented to him. Because if he goes beyond these he will lack 
guidance and may not understand interests that are affected 
by a decision outside the framework.' "57 
There is some indication that other judges may take this view.158 
Apart from admissibility, there is the problem of weight. 
Social science often deals with emotional and controversial areas 
of life. Often it may be difficult for the court, and for the social 
scientists, to separate uncertain controversy from positive fact :find-
ing. Justice Frankfurter indicated judicial concern over the un-
certainty of such evidence during oral argument in the school 
cases. He said, "I do not mean that I disrespect it. I simply know 
its character. It can be a very different thing from, as I say, things 
57 WYUNSKI, A TRIAL JUDGE'S FREEDOM AND REsPONS1BILITY 18-19 (1952). In the school 
segregation cases the question of admissibility was not clearly raised. But it appears that 
the parties and the court assumed that the testimony was offered for a conventional 
purpose. 
58 See, Borden's Farm Products v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 at 209, 55 S.Ct. 187 (1934); 
People v. Larsen, 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 55 at 56 (1938); Parmelee v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1940) 
113 F. (2d) 729' at 737. 
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that are weighed and measured and are fungible. We are dealing 
here with very subtle things, very subtle testimony."59 This un-
certainty is compounded by distrust of experts in general, indi-
cated in the Isenstadt case: they are frequently in conflict, often 
argumentative, and expensive. Besides all this, most judges come 
from a generation less versed in, and less sympathetic to, the newer 
scientific disciplines than the younger lawyers. Interestingly, 
when social scientists' conclusions have been accepted, as we noted, 
some courts have written that they appeared correct apart from 
the evidence. 
In recent articles, Professor Edmond Cahn has criticized the 
testimony of the social scientists in the school segregation cases.60 
He notes first that there is an unfortunate impression that the de-
cision was based solely upon their testimony. He writes that 
counsel for the plaintiffs were wise in using everything available 
to make their cases, but that the testimony was not necessary be-
cause "for at least twenty years, hardly any cultivated person has 
questioned that segregation is cruel to Negro school children."61 
Beyond this, he severely criticizes some of the testimony itself, hold-
ing it non-scientific and self-contradictory. He believes that foot-
note 11 of the Court's opinion, citing social scientific writings,62 
was in the nature of a consolation prize to the social science wit-
nesses for not having mentioned their testimony. He is concerned 
that social science will suffer from participation in litigation: "At 
present, it is still possible for the social psychologist to 'hoodwink 
a judge who is not overwise' without intending to do so; but suc-
cesses of this kind are too costly for science to desire them."63 
And he is concerned for the law: "Recognizing as we do how 
sagacious Mr. Justice Holmes was to insist that the Constitution 
be not tied to the wheels of any economic system whatsoever, we 
ought to keep it similarly uncommitted in relation to the other 
social sciences."64 But, it may be that he is more cordial than indi-
59 Transcript of Argument, Gebhart v. Belton, No. 448 in the Supreme Court of the 
United States, October term, 1952, p. 69. 
60 Cahn, "Jurisprudence," in 1954 Annual Survey of American Law, 30 N.Y. UNiv. L. 
R.Ev. 150 (1955); "Jurisprudence" in 1955 Annual Survey of American Law, 31 N.Y. UNIV. 
L. REv. 182 (1956). See also Frank, "The Lawyer's Role in Modern Society: A Round 
Table,'' 4 J. PuB. L. 1 at 8 (1955). 
6130 N.Y. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 150 at 159. What does "cultivated" mean? See the opinion 
in Hayes v. Crutcher, quoted in note 54 supra, and Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of 
Control, (Fla. 1955) 83 S. (2d) 20. These examples are not isolated. 
62 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 at 494, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954). 
63 Cahn, "Jurisprudence,'' 30 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 150 at 166 (1955). 
64 Id. at 167. 
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cated above, for he characterizes his attitude as follows: "All in 
all, the attitude I favored toward social psychology would express 
receptivity seasoned with critical judgment."65 
Of course, he is correct, as noted earlier, in concluding that the 
decisions did not rest upon the testimony of the social scientists. 
A great many factors contributed to the decision,66 not the least 
important of which, as Professor Cahn writes, was the general 
knowledge "that segregation is cruel to Negro children." But 
much credit for this general awareness is due to the work of social 
scientists during recent decades. In the school cases may not the 
awareness have been fortified, or (there are nine justices) in some 
cases instilled by the testimony of experts in the field? As to trust-
worthiness, the testimony was subjected to cross-examination and 
rebuttal by very capable defense counsel who, after the trial of the 
first school case, could not have been surprised. And even experts 
for the defense conceded it to be essentially correct. This is not 
to say that it had the precision of the physical sciences; it did not. 
Perhaps even, in time, some of the evidence upon which the testi-
mony was based will, as happens in all sciences, be shown to have 
been wrong or insufficient. But it told us a very great deal about 
what is known of segregation's harm. True, the Constitution 
should not be wedded to any social science any more than to a 
school of economics. On the other hand, constitutional interpreta-
tion should consider all relevant knowledge. The Constitution 
turned on a moral judgment; but moral judgments are generated 
by awareness of facts. Professor Cahn's objections are, of course, 
of less force when applied to social science testimony in cases like 
the trademark cases where no constitutional questions are involved. 
Despite all the problems discussed above, there has been an 
increase in the use of this kind of testimony. Lawyers turn to the 
sources that are available to support their clients' contentions, and 
they are beginning to believe that social science can state some 
conclusions with a good degree of persuasiveness. This confidence 
has probably been enhanced by the undergraduate training in 
modern social science of at least the more recent law school grad-
uate. But primarily, the increase has been caused by the growing 
number of lawsuits involving public law issues. More and more 
lawyers must produce facts bearing on issues that concern the 
public: they must establish what the public thinks, or how it will 
65 Cahn, "Jurisprudence," 31 N.Y. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 182 at 183 (1956). 
66 See HILL AND GREENBERG, CITIZENS GUIDE TO DESEGREGATION (passim) (1955). 
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react, or the effect of social conditions on large groups of people. 
This has directed attention to a search for new fact-finding tech-
mques. 
Lawyers in greater numbers are undoubtedly going to use 
social scientists where they feel their testimony can help. As a 
new generation of judges ascends to the bench, and social science 
achieves greater certaipty, more of this evidence will be influential 
in deciding lawsuits. One court of appeals, perhaps over-optimisti-
cally, looks forward to the day "when social scientists can advise 
not only courts, but the people generally; just as physicians, 
chemists and other physical scientists do today."67 
This new development is, of course, of great significance to the 
social scientists. It will afford them the satisfaction of close partic-
ipation in the operation of society and the administration of jus-
tice. It will probably direct their work more toward immediate 
social problems which find their way into litigation. It will place 
upon them the advantage and control of certain external checks of 
verifiability. It will impose a duty to be objective when the effects 
of their research will have consequences outside the university, 
especially where their personal feelings may be involved in the 
issues of the lawsuit. 
Over fifteen years ago, Robert S. Lynd wrote that "Social 
science is not a scholarly arcanum, but an organized part of the 
culture which exists to help man in continually understanding and 
building his culture."68 A similar statement might be made of 
law. Fortunately, there is room for the two to work in combina-
tion. 
67 Parmelee v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 729 at 737. 
68 LYND, KNOWLEDGE FOR WHAT1 THE PLACE OF SoCIAL SCIENCE IN AMERICAN CULTURE, 
p. ix (1939). 
